Should AFSPA be repealed?

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958) gives military personnel in 'disturbed areas' the power to arrest without warrant, search without warrant, and use lethal force if they judge it necessary, and grants them legal immunity from prosecution without prior central government sanction. It has been in continuous operation in Manipur since 1980 and was withdrawn from most of Nagaland and Assam only in recent years. It briefly applied in parts of J&K and was withdrawn from most of Punjab after militancy ended.

Its supporters call it essential for the army to operate effectively in active insurgencies. Its critics call it a blank cheque for impunity, and the Supreme Court has agreed, describing its operation as enabling 'excesses' and 'false encounters'.

AFSPA was enacted in 1958, directly modelled on the British Armed Forces (Special Powers) Ordinance used during the Quit India Movement (1942). It was designed for the Naga insurgency. Over subsequent decades it was extended to Manipur, parts of Assam, Punjab during the militancy of the 1980s, and Jammu & Kashmir after 1990.

The Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005) recommended its repeal, finding that the Act 'has become a symbol of oppression, an object of hate and an instrument of discrimination and high-handedness.' The Santosh Hegde Commission found evidence of extrajudicial killings in Manipur. Despite this, the law has remained in force in the Northeast. In 2022 the government withdrew AFSPA from several districts following peace negotiations with insurgent groups.

• Active insurgencies require rapid response; legal proceedings after every operation would paralyse the army in a live conflict.
• False cases can be filed against soldiers to demoralise them; sanction requirements provide a filter.
• Peace in Nagaland, Mizoram, and much of Assam was achieved while AFSPA was in force, suggesting it enabled rather than obstructed conflict resolution.

• The sanction requirement for prosecution has almost never been granted, effectively granting permanent immunity even in documented cases of fake encounters.
• The Supreme Court ruled in Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families v. Union of India (2016) that AFSPA does not exempt the military from investigation for excessive force.
• Long-term AFSPA deployment in Manipur has coincided with persistent human rights concerns rather than resolution, suggesting it sustains rather than resolves conflict.

Most democracies keep their military under civilian legal jurisdiction even in internal conflicts, with specific laws for counterterrorism operations rather than blanket field immunity. The UK's handling of Northern Ireland, including the Bloody Sunday inquiry, eventual prosecutions, and the Saville Report, shows a democracy grappling with army conduct in an internal conflict under normal legal accountability. India's AFSPA framework has fewer accountability mechanisms than comparable democracies.

Northeastern civil society and opposition parties from the region have long demanded repeal. National parties in power have consistently resisted, deferring to army preferences. It is one area where both Congress and BJP governments have taken near-identical positions, leaving the debate largely between the state and civil society rather than between parties.

Your view on AFSPA moves the Authority axis sharply: backing its retention reads as prioritising state security power over individual rights; backing repeal reads as a civil-liberties position. It also connects to the Nation axis through how India treats its peripheral regions.